Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 13
Issue 3 Spring 1982

Article 5

1982

Joint and Several Lialibity under Superfund
Anita M. D'Arcy

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Anita M. D'Arcy, Joint and Several Lialibity under Superfund, 13 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 489 (1982).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol13/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Joint and Several Liability under Superfund
INTRODUCTION

Improper and inadequate disposal of hazardous wastes' constitutes an environmental problem of epic proportions.2 About ninety
percent of the fifty-seven million tons of hazardous industrial
waste produced annually in the United States is disposed of improperly.3 A study prepared for the Environmental Protection
Agency reported that anywhere from 32,000 to 50,000 disposal sites

1. Section 1004(5) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) defines hazardous waste to be:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). This definition was adopted by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 [hereinafter referred to as Superfund]. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (Supp. IV 1980). Liability under Superfund,
however, is triggered by a release or threatened release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4) (Supp IV 1980). Hazardous substances include more materials than hazardous
wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. IV 1980).
2. For decades, thousands upon thousands of tons of hazardous chemical wastes
have been deposited in our environment. The sites where they are dumped, with
their contents of long-lasting chemicals, now represent lethal time capsules which
year by year release their toxic contents into our surface waters, our groundwaters,
and seriously degrade our landscape, and that essential element of our life support
system-our water supply.
Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal:Joint Hearings on S. 1341 and S. 1480 Before the
Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on
Environmental and Public Works (Part 4), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979) (statement of
Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Administrator, Water and Waste Management, EPA) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous Waste Hearings, Part 4].
Love Canal is only one of several crisis situations involving the release of hazardous substances. Other incidents include: the "Valley of the Drums" in Kentucky, where 20,000 to
30,000 barrels of discarded, leaking and unlabeled wastes were discovered; Charles City,
Iowa, where arsenic and orthonitroanitive are suspected of leaking into the water supply of
300,000 people; Moscow Mills, Missouri, where waste oil containing dioxin, which causes
significant symptoms at levels of 5 parts per trillion, was sprayed at a horse arena. Id. at 33;
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., Six
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store some hazardous wastes." Approximately 1,000 to 2,000 of
these sites may store significant quantities of hazardous wastes.'
As the amount of hazardous wastes generated gradually increases,
the shortage of safe disposal sites becomes more significant." Furthermore, the costs of the most limited restoration of inactive haz4. FRED C. HART ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NATIONAL
HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS 10-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT].
The estimates in this report are extremely rough. Hazardous Waste Hearings, Part 4, supra
note 2, at 12, 37.
5. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 10-16.
6. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Finding a Safe Disposal Site Takes Time,
ENVIRONMENT MIDWEST 14 (1981). According to a new study, the total volume of hazardous
waste will increase from 60 million to 85 million tons between 1980 and 1990. 12 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 104 (May 15, 1981). This study also predicted that the hazardous waste market
would expand by 42%. Id. The weight of evidence, however, would indicate that such expansion is unlikely. Congressman James J. Florio of New Jersey, a leading sponsor of the
Superfund legislation, has reported that there is a substantial shortage of disposal sites and
that 50 to 125 new disposal cites will be needed by 1985. Public Must Accept Risk in Siting
New Waste Facilities, Conference Told, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 314, 315 (July 3, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Risk in Siting]. In addition, Florio warned that this shortage probably will
be exacerbated if more existing facilities close or if permits to continue operating under the
new hazardous waste regulations are denied to a significant number of the other facilities.
Id. Finally, new disposal sites may be rapidly filled by wastes that were removed from old
sites cleaned up under Superfund. Id.
Public opposition is also hindering the development of new disposal sites. Farkas, Overcoming Public Opposition to the Establishment of New Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 9
CAP. U.L. REV. 451 (1980). As a result, alternatives to disposal sites have been suggested.
See Risk in Siting, supra this note, at 315. Such alternatives include:
-Reduce
the quantity of hazardous wastes to be managed through changes in
processes, operating conditions, and feedstocks;
-Reduce
the volume of wastes by separating hazardous from non-hazardous
materials and disposing them separately;
-Detoxify hazardous materials through chemical reactions;
-Destroy wastes by converting hazardous materials to non-hazardous, although
this applies only to large waste volumes;
-Incinerate organic wastes;
-"Fix" or solidify wastes to make hazardous components nonleakable before
placing them in landfills;
-Spread organic wastes on land; and
-Place wastes in landfills.
Id.
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently upheld an order to close a landfill and to remove
200,000 drums of hazardous waste at a cost of up to $20 million. Village of Wilsonville v.
SCA Serv., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 27, 426 N.E.2d 824, 841 (1981). The Illinois Environment Protection Agency licensed the facility at Wilsonville, and the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, in addition to declaring it "secure," chose the site to deposit PCBs removed from an illegal dump. The court, however, found that the defendant had supplied
most of the data that these agencies relied upon and that this date was inaccurate. 86 Ill. 2d
at 37, 426 N.E.2d at 837. This decision rendered a devastating blow to the hazardous waste
industry. If other courts follow this precedent and refuse to consider the cost of removal of
wastes or alternatives to removal, the hazardous waste disposal industry may be crippled.
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ardous waste disposal sites range from $3 to $6 billion. 7 Complete
restoration may cost up to $40 billion.8
Because existing federal legislation failed to address the
problems caused by inactive hazardous waste sites9 and because an
emergency response fund for current and future releases of hazardous substances was deemed necessary, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, commonly referred to as Superfund.' 0 Superfund establishes a $1.6 billion fund for the clean up of hazardous waste
facilities posing an imminent danger to the environment and the
public health and welfare. 1 Under this Act, the President is authorized to order private parties connected with the disposal of the
hazardous substances to clean up the facility and to seek reimbursement for any Superfund money expended in the clean up
efforts. 2
Many compromises led to the approval of Superfund in the final
days of a lame duck session of the Ninety-sixth Congress.13 One

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 37.
8. Id.
9. The various federal acts that regulate hazardous substances include: Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976); The Deepwater Parts Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 15011524 (Supp. IV 1980); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016987 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 16511655 (1976); and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 and 1801
(1976). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provides comprehensive regulation of
parties connected with the disposal of hazardous wastes; however, it only applies prospectively. For a general discussion of the inadequacy of federal law, see INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE, THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 31-40 (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT].
10. Superfund, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1980).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. IV 1980).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9696 (Supp. IV 1980).
13. The elimination of a federal cause of action for medical claims and other third party
damages ranks among the most controversial compromises. Of this deletion, Senator George
Mitchell remarked: "This Senate has made the judgment that property is more significant
than human beings. We are telling the people of this country that under our value system
property is worth compensating, but a human life is not." 38 CONG. Q.W. REP. 3435 (Nov.
29, 1980). Other federal statutes provide limited and haphazard compensation to individuals
injured by hazardous substances. Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances
Pollution:An Analysis of Existing FederalStatutes, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4-28 (1981).
Tort law also presents many obstacles to recovery, such as statutes of limitation and proximate causation. See Comment, Environmental Health: An Analysis of Available and Proposed Remedies for Victims of Toxic Waste Contamination, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 61 (1981);
Note, Denial of a Remedy: Former Residents of Hazardous Waste Sites and New York's
Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 161 (1982); Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949 (1980);

7.
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such compromise was the deletion of a provision making those parties connected with the disposal of the hazardous substances
jointly and severally liable1 4 for the expenses of clean up measures. 15 The legislative history and statutory language of
Superfund indicate that the issue of joint and several liability was
not completely resolved with this deletion. It appears instead that
traditional and evolving principles of common law shall govern the
determination of whether joint and several liability will be applied. 6 To administer Superfund effectively and to fulfill its purposes, the courts will have to impose joint and several liability by
relying upon the evolving principles of common law.
This note will discuss the approach that Superfund takes to provide for joint and several liability. It will examine the basic provisions of Superfund, with particular attention to the liability section. Next, the legislative history on the issue of joint and several
liability will be reviewed. A discussion of section 311 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, upon which Superfund's liability provision is statutorily based, shall follow. The history and the application of joint and several liability under the common law, especially in pollution cases, will also be examined and analyzed.
Application of joint and several liability to cases involving the release of hazardous substances shall be discussed. Finally, imposition of joint and several liability under Superfund will be
recommended.
EXAMINATION OF SUPERFUND

Superfund establishes a $1.6 billion Hazardous Substances Response Fund derived from a tax on the chemical and petroleum
Note, The Development of a Strict Liability Cause of Action for PersonalInjuries Resulting from Hazardous Waste, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 543 (1981). Plaintiffs injured by improperly disposed hazardous wastes may be able to sue the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for its failure to adequately regulate hazardous waste disposal
practices. Note, Love Canal et al.: The Federal Government's Rights, Responsibilities,and
Liabilities for the Damages from Chemical Dumps (pts. 1 & 2), 17 TIAL 12 (Oct. 1981), 17
TRIAL 32 (Nov. 1981). The plaintiffs cause of action would be based on the doctrine of
gratuitous undertaking, under which a duty to act carefully may be imposed on someone
who acts gratuitously. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). See Raymer v. United
States, 455 F. Supp. 165, 167-68 (W.D. Ky. 1978).
14. Under joint and several liability, each of two or more persons is liable for the entire
amount of damages to an injured person. That person can sue one or more of the defendants
separately or together. Cf. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Bell, 172 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943).
15. 126 CONG. REC. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
16. Id. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
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industries and from federal funds.' Under Superfund, the utilization of this fund and other hazardous waste remedies rests within
the discretion of the President, who has subsequently delegated
much of this authority to the Environmental Protection Agency.' 8
If a hazardous substance or a pollutant posing an imminent and
substantial danger to public health is released into the environment, or if there is a substantial threat of such a release, the President is authorized to respond in several ways. Under section 104 of
Superfund, the President may order the removal of hazardous substances or pollutants, and implement remedial action, such as onsite treatment of hazardous substances. 19 Such federal intervention, however, is conditioned on the President's determination that
17. 26 U.S.C. §9 4611, 4612, 4661 (Supp. IV 1980) (amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code); 42 U.S.C. §9 9631-9633 (Supp. IV 1980) . The taxes imposed on oil and on 42 specific
chemical compounds will provide 87.5% of the fund, and the remaining 12.5% will be taken
from the Treasury Department's general tax revenues. Superfund Closes the Gap, ENVIRONMENT MIDWEST 29 (1981).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (Supp. IV 1980). The President has delegated primary responsibility for enforcing Superfund to the Environmental Protection Agency. Exec. Order
No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981). Other agencies with authority are the Treasury Department, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Labor, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Federal Maritime Commission. Superfund at Square One: Promising Statutory Framework Requires Forceful EPA
Implementation, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,101, 10,102 (May 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Superfund at Square One]. In addition, Superfund created a new agency, the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (Supp. IV 1980). With the assistance of the states and of named environmental and public health agencies, the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is to establish a national registry of serious diseases
and illnesses, as well as a national registry of individuals exposed to toxic substances. 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). If public health emergencies apparently caused by exposure to toxic substance occur, the agency is required to provide medical care and testing
to exposed individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Superfund draws a distinction between "removal" and "remedial" action. Removal refers to "the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment.
... 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (Supp. IV 1980). Removal includes such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess and evaluate the release
or threat of release, the disposal of the materials that were removed, or the implementation
of other actions necessary to prevent, reduce or mitigate damage to the public health or the
environment. Id. Specific removal action extends to security fencing, provisions for alternative water supplies, and temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals. Id.
Remedial refers to actions designed as a permanent remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (Supp.
IV 1980). Remedial action can be taken instead of or in addition to removal action. Id.
Examples of remedial action include: storage and confinement of the release at the original
site; recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive waste; and repair or
replacement of leaking containers. Id. Remedial action also covers the costs of permanent
relocation of residents, businesses and community facilities where the President concludes
that such relocation is more cost effective than and environmentally preferable to various
removal and remedial measures. Id.
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the party responsible for the actual or threatened release will not
himself properly carry out removal or remedial action.2 0 Assuming
such a finding is made, the President is also authorized to order
the Attorney General under section 106 to secure the relief necessary to abate the danger.2 1 In addition, the President may issue
such orders as may be necessary to protect the public health and
environment. 2
Superfund requires the states to participate in financing clean
up efforts.2" After $1 million has been expended or six months has
elapsed from the initiation of clean up measures, the President
cannot continue response action absent extreme emergency unless
the state has entered a contract or cooperative agreement with the
federal government.2 4 Under this contract, the state must agree to
undertake the following tasks: first, to assure future maintenance
of the removal and remedial actions implemented by the federal
government; second, to assure the availability of hazardous waste

disposal facilities in compliance with subtitle C of RCRA; and
third, to bear or to assure ten percent of the expenditure for remedial action, including all future maintenance, and at least fifty percent of the total expenditure where the state was partially responsible for the release or where the state owned or operated the

facility which released hazardous substances or pollutants. 5
Under Superfund, the costs of cleaning up hazardous substances

20. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 9604 lists other powers the President
may exercise. For instance, the President may conduct investigations, monitoring, surveys,
and testing to determine the existence and extent of a release, the source and nature of the
hazardous substances or pollutants involved, and the degree of danger to the public health
and environment. Furthermore, the President may undertake such studies or investigations
needed for implementing removal and remedial actions, recovering the costs thereof, and
enforcing the provisions of Superfund.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
22. Id. Wilful violation or failure to comply with a presidential order may result in a fine
of $5,000 for each day the violation occurs. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). The role of the states in responding to releases from hazardous waste sites under Superfund has been expanded by the National Contingency Plan (NCP). Final, National Contingency Plan Issued Giving States GreaterRole
Under Superfund, [Current Developments] ENTrr. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 364 (July 16,
1982). Pursuant to § 105 of Superfund the EPA promulgated the final version of the NCP
on July 12, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1982). The NCP allows states to serve on regional
response teams, to assist in developing federal, regional, or local plans, to be notified of
possible or actual discharge or releases, and to submit candidates for priority cleanup. 47
Fed. Reg. 31,208, 31,209, 31,210, 31,215 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.32(b),
300.32 (b)(2), 300.32(b)(5), 300.33 (b)(5), 300.36(c), 300.66(d)).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
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is ultimately to be born by those private individuals responsible for
the disposal. Section 107 imposes liability for the costs of cleaning
up the release of hazardous substances and the damages for injury,
destruction or loss of natural resources upon four categories of individuals."8 Those individuals include: present owners and operators of a vessel or a facility; any person who at the time of disposal
operated or owned a hazardous waste disposal facility; any person
who arranged with a transporter for the disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances; and, any person who has accepted hazard7
ous substances for transport to a disposal or treatment facility.
Generally, the parties that are potentially liable under Superfund
are referred to as owners, operators, generators, and transporters.
Owners of disposal sites are liable for cleanup costs and damages
under two circumstances, if they owned the land at the time that
the hazardous substances were disposed of on their land, s or if
they currently own and operate a disposal facility.29 Operators are
liable if they ran a facility that accepted hazardous substances.8 0
Generators of hazardous substances are liable if they dispose of the

42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 9607(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to thq defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
26.
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hazardous substances at a facility they own or operate."' They are
also liable when they arrange by contract or agreement for the disposal of the hazardous substances at a facility owned and operated
by someone else. 2 Finally, transporters are also liable under two
circumstances. First, if they agree to transport the hazardous substances to a facility chosen by the shipper, then they are liable for
a somewhat limited amount of costs and damages.3 3 In the second
situation, the transporter may be fully liable as an owner and operator of a vessel if the transporter selects the disposal facility."
Section 107(a) identifies specific parties who may potentially be
liable for the costs and damages associated with a release of hazardous substances from a disposal facility.3 5 Section 107(a), however, does not define the scope of liability.38 Although section 107
does provide for strict liability, the question of whether that liability is joint or several is never addressed. 7 The use of the connector
"and" between the categories of liable parties arguably could be
interpreted to mean that each party is jointly liable, but frequently
the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" are found to be interchangeable."' Furthermore, it is not only unclear whether members of differing categories of liable parties are jointly and severally
liable, but also whether members within a single category are

31. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4), (c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
36. Id. Scope means the extent of liability.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Although the term "strict liability" is not mentioned, it is implied. Section 9601(32) provides that the liability under Superfund is the
same as under § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(1976), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 311 of the FWPCA has
been interpreted to apply strict liability. Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596
F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 654 F.2d 964, 982 (1st Cir. 1977).
Furthermore, strict liability can be implied by failure to list general defenses based upon the
exercise of due care. Superfund at Square One, supra note 18, at 10,103. However, §
9607(b) provides three limited defenses that include act of God, act of war and third party
responsibility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (Supp. IV 1980). For the third party defense to apply, the
defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the third party, who is not
related by employment or contract, caused the pollution and that the defendant exercised
due care in respect to the hazardous substances and the third party. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) (Supp. IV 1980). The common law exception to strict liability for common carriers is not recognized under Superfund, since common carriers are included in the
parties to be held liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980); Note, Superfund: Conscripting Industry Support for Environmental Cleanup, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 524, 525-26 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Conscripting Industry Support].
38. 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14 (4th ed. 1973).

19821

Liability under Superfund

jointly and severally liable. Because generators of the hazardous
substances are the deep pockets in the hazardous substance cycle,
whether liability is joint and several is a crucial question for both
the generators and the government.3 9 Therefore, the legislative history of Superfund must be examined to determine whether Congress intended liability to be joint or several.40
Legislative History Concerning Joint and Several Liability
After three years of working on hazardous waste fund bills and
oil spill bills, 4' Congress enacted Superfund as a compromise bill

39. See Note, Conscripting Industry Support, supra note 37, at 543 n.133.
40. A court may examine legislative history where a statute is unclear or where a statute
is a product of conflict and compromise between strongly held but opposing views. Wirtz v.
Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463 (1968); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co.,
317 U.S. 476 (1943). In Harrison, the Supreme Court utilized legislative history to determine that words in the Revenue Act reversed a prior Supreme Court case. In justifying its
reliance on legislative history, the Supreme Court stressed that "words are inexact tools at
best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory
legislative history no matter how clear the words may appear on superficial examination."
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. at 479. See also Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72,
78-79 (1974); Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972); 2 A. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 48.01 (4th ed. 1973).

Furthermore, where an act is a product of conflict and compromise between strongly held
and opposing views, its proper construction often "requires consideration of its wording
against the background of its legislative history and in light of the general objectives Congress sought to achieve." Wirtz v. Local 135, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468
(1968). In Wirtz, the Supreme Court used legislative history to interpret a provision of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act [hereinafter cited as LMRDA]. The Court
noted a comment of one of the bill's authors, who had explained that much of the bill had
been revised on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives and that several
provisions contain calculated ambiguities or political compromises so as to obtain passage of
the act. Id. at 468 n.6.
Like the LMRDA, Superfund was the product of conflict and compromise between
strongly held and opposing views. Not only did various members of Congress disagree on
whether liability should be joint and several, they also hotly debated and ultimately compromised on several issues including the size of the fund and whether the act should provide
for medical claims and other third party damages. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
Most of these compromises were made after the bills had been reported out by the committees for debate on the floor of Congress. Id. Members from both houses repeatedly explained
that these compromises were made to secure passage of Superfund, which would provide the
funds desperately needed for the clean up of hazardous waste facilities posing imminent
danger. 126 CONG. Rc. S14,962-3 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph);
Id. at S14,968 (statement of Sen. Stafford); Id. at S14,973 (statement of Sen. Mitchell); 126
CONG. REC. H11,790 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Representative Florio); Id. at
H11,793 (statement of Rep. Gibbons); Id. at H11,795 (statement of Rep. Biaggi). Therefore,
consideration of the legislative history is not only appropriate but necessary for the proper
construction of the liability provision in § 107 of Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV
1980).
41. 126 CONG. REc. S14,963 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
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that differed significantly from previous proposals. 2 Three bills,
4
and Senate Bill 1480,46
namely House Bill 85,'" House Bill 7020
were partially incorporated in the final act.4" Throughout congressional consideration of Superfund, the issue of joint and several

liability was highly debated.
Under the earlier versions of H.R. 7020 and S. 1480, joint and
several liability was imposed upon parties connected with the disposal of hazardous substances in a somewhat modified form. The
original H.R. 7020 initially imposed joint and several liability upon
responsible parties but allowed them to recover any money expended in excess of their proportionate share from the established
fund. 4 This bill, however, was subsequently amended to provide
traditional joint and several liability. 48 Like the original H.R. 7020,
the first version of S. 1480 also allowed reimbursement from the
fund.'9 In addition, S. 1480 included rules of contribution to be

42. See Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR L.
REV. 253 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Eckhardt].
43. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill was limited to the clean up of oil spills
from a fund derived from a tax on oil. Joint and several liability was applied to owners and
operators of vessels or facilities. 1A F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §
4A.04[2][b] (lst ed. Supp. 1981).
44. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
45. H.R. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
46. 1A F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.0412][a] (lst ed. Supp. 1981).
47. Section 3041(c) of H.R. 7020 provided:
Apportionment of Costs of Responsible Parties-Where there are two or more responsible parties with respect to any inactive hazardous waste site, if one of such
responsible parties is ordered to take action under this section which results in the
expenditure of amounts which he establishes to be in excess of his proportionate
share of such costs, such party may recover such excess amount from the
Fund....
H.R. Rm. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980).
48. Congressman Albert Gore, Jr. of Tennessee introduced an amendment, which would
allow apportionment of damages only after the defendant established by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was responsible for only a specific portion of the damage done. 126
CONG. REc. H9464 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (statement of Rep. Gore). If a defendant could
not establish his liability for the damages, then he could be held fully liable. Id. at H9465.
Gore explained that an obvious problem with the apportionment system under H.R. 7020
was that the Government "would be forced to seek payment from each of the defendants
based on the amount designated by the court as that which he owes." Id. Gore maintained
that the Government should be able to collect fully from one defendant who contributed to
an indivisible harm and that the defendants should bear the burden of seeking contribution
from others who were also responsible for the injury. Id. Gore's amendment was adopted.
Id. at H9468. The amended H.R. 7020 was subsequently approved by the House of Representatives. Id. at H9478-79.
49. Section 4(a) of S. 1480 provides that a party will only be liable for his contribution to
the release or damages if he establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that his activity
was not a significant factor in causing or contributing to the release, discharge, disposal or
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applied to parties that were found to be jointly and severally
liable. 50
The Senate significantly amended S. 1480. On November 24,
1980, the Senate considered S. 1480 and approved a compromise
version of S. 1480 by way of amendment.5 1 Under the amended S.
1480, all references to joint and several liability were deleted. 2 In
listing the changes made by the compromise bill, Senator Randolph5a maintained that common law principles would determine
"when parties should be severally liable."' 5 4 After the Senate apthe damages sustained and that his contribution can be distinguished or apportioned. S.
REP. No. 484, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1980).
50. To achieve more equitable apportionment of liability, § 4(f)(4) provided the following factors which the courts could consider:
(1) The ability of the party to demonstrate that his contribution to the release
can be distinguished;
(2) The amount of hazardous substance involved. Of course, a small quantity of
a highly toxic material, or above which releases or makes more dangerous another
hazardous substance, would be a significant factor;
(3) The degree of toxicity of the hazardous substance involved;
(4) The degree of involvement of the person in the manufacture, treatment,
transport, or disposal of the hazardous substance; and
(5) The degree of cooperation between the person and the Federal, State, or local government in preventing harm to public health or the environment from occurring from a release. This includes efforts to mitigate damage after a release
occurs.
Id. at 38-39.
51. 126 CONG. REC. S14,988 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). Some of the changes included:
reducing the fund from $4.1 billion for six years to $1.6 billion for five years; elimination of
a federal cause of action for medical, property or income loss; and deletion of special medical causation provisions. Id. at S14,964.
Senator Robert T. Stafford of Vermont, who assisted Senator Jennings Randolph of West
Virginia in drafting the compromise bill, said the compromise contained approximately 25%
of what was in the original S. 1480. 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.3435 (Nov. 29, 1980). Stafford
stated huge concessions were made to overcome the objections of many Senate Republicans.
Id.
52. 126 CONG. REC. 814,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
53. Senator Randolph was the chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works which reported the original S. 1480. 126 CONG. REc. 814,962 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
As the committeeman in charge of Superfund in the Senate, his remarks and answers to
questions are to be given the same weight as formal committee reports. Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
48.4 (4th ed. 1973). Committee reports are generally considered highly persuasive evidence
of congressional intent. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); Hous.
Auth. of City of Omaha, Neb. v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972); 2 A.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.06 (4th ed. 1973).
54. 126 CONG. REc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). Randolph further explained:
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be
governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. An example is
joint and several liability. Any reference to these terms has been deleted, and liability of joint tortfeasors will be determined under common or previous statutory
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proved the compromise bill, Senator Helms" applauded the elimination of joint and several liability on the grounds that joint and
several liability destroyed "any meaningful link between culpable
conduct and financial responsibility. '"5" In attempting to clarify the
standard of liability under the compromise, Senator Stafford 57 explained that no new language was added to the compromise so as
to avoid confusion and that the standard of liability to be employed would be the same as that in section 311 of the Clean
Water Act."
The Senate consideration of H.R. 7020 resulted in a motion to
strike all provisions after the enabling clause and to insert the language of S. 1480 in lieu thereof." The motion was granted, and
H.R. 7020 was passed. 6a The end result of this process was the
elimination of reference to joint and several liability in H.R. 7020.
The House ultimately adopted the Senate version of Superfund,
free of the provision imposing joint and several liability." In supporting the Senate amendments to H.R. 7020, Congressman Florio
proposed that the issue of joint and several liability should be determined by section 311 of the Clean Water Act and traditional
law.
Id.
55. Since Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina was a vigorous opponent of the original
S. 1480 bill and was not responsible for the preparation or drafting of the compromise bill,
his remarks are entitled to little weight. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g
denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, reh'g denied, 351
U.S. 980 (1956).
56. 126 CONG. REc. S15,004 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Helms). According to Helms, the joint and several liability provision was especially pernicious "not only
because of the exceedingly broad categories of persons subject to liability and the wide array
of damages available, but also because it was coupled with an industry-based fund." Id.
Helms claimed that those companies that must contribute to the fund are often paying for
conditions they did not cause.
57. Senator Stafford sponsored both the original and compromise version of S. 1480;
therefore, his statements should be given substantial weight. Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, reh'g denied, 351 U.S. 980 (1956). As the ranking minority member on
the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Senator Stafford was named as the successor to the position of chairman while Superfund was being debated in the Senate.
58. 126 CONG. R.c. S15,008 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
59. Id. at S15,009 (motion made by Sen. Randolph). The substitution of H.R. 7020 was
necessary since all revenue acts must originate in the House. IA F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENV[RONMEN'AL LAW § 4A.04[2][fJ (1st ed. Supp. 1981).
60. 126 CONG. REc. S15,009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
61. The House considered H.R. 7020, as amended by the Senate, under a suspension of
the rules. 126 CONG. REc. H11,773 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (motion made by Rep. Florio). A
suspension of the rules means that no amendments to the bill are allowed and the bill must
be passed as presented. 1A F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVmONMENTAL LAW § 4A.0412][g] (1st ed.
Supp. 1981).
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and evolving principles of common law.62 The House passed H.R.
7020, as amended by the Senate. 8 On December 11, 1980, the
President signed the Superfund bill.4
The legislative history surrounding the issue of joint and several
liability under Superfnd is ambiguous. The original versions of
H.R. 7020 and S. 1480 indicated a congressional concern that damages be apportioned whenever feasible. The eventual deletion of
the joint and several liability provision may possibly have been the
result of extensive lobbying efforts made by various chemical companies. When questioned about the deletion, Senator Randolph
and Representative Florio stressed that this deletion was not determinative of the question of joint and several liability. Instead
they maintained that the scope of liability under Superfund was to
be determined by section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the traditional and evolving principles of common law.
Therefore, the only conclusion that can be drawn from this legislative history is that the deletion of the joint and several liability
provision should not be considered a clear congressional mandate
and that section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
and the common law must be examined to determine the scope of
liability under Superfund.
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act
Section 101(32) of Superfund expressly provides that the standard of liability employed by Superfund is the same as applied
under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act). 5 Section 311(f) of the Clean Water Act"

62. 126 CONG. REc. H1l,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). As chairman of the Subcommittee
on Transportation and Commerce, Florio was the committee member in charge of
Superfund on the floor of the House, and accordingly his statements carry great weight. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
In addition, Florio submitted two letters to be included as part of the record. One letter
written by Alan H. Parker, the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs,
discussed the issues of strict and joint liability under Superfund. 126 CONG. REc. H1,788
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). Parker maintained that § 107(a)(2) of H.R. 7020 provided for a
right to contribution and that such a right is "only of value to a defendant who has been
held jointly and severally liable." Id. Parker stated that the Department of Justice believed
that the common law imposes joint and several liability where the acts or omissions of two
or more wrongdoers cause an indivisible injury. Id.
63. Id. at H11,802-11,803.

64.

IA F.

GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONmENTAL LAW

§ 4A.04 [2][g] (1st ed. Supp. 1981).

65. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. IV 1980).
66. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 311(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)
(1976).
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makes owners or operators of facilities or vessels that discharge oil
or designated hazardous substances into navigable waters or adjoining shorelines liable for costs of cleanup and mitigation." Section 311, however, does not specify whether liability is joint or several." Furthermore, the courts have not expressly ruled on the
issue of joint and several liability under section 311.69 Therefore,
section 311 of the Clean Water Act does not offer significant guidance on the issue of whether liability is joint or several under
Superfund.7 e
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AT

COMMON LAW

Because neither the legislative history nor section 311 of the
Clean Water Act provide assistance in determining the scope of
liability under Superfund, an examination of what the sponsors of
Superfund called the "traditional and evolving principles of common law" is required. The concept of joint and several liability has
been subject to much confusion primarily because various courts
have defined and applied the term "joint tort" differently.7 1 Under
67.

Id. Section 311 of the Clean Water Act established a fund, which is to be maintained

at $35 million, from which the federal government can draw money to carry out cleanup
operations. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k) (1976). The federal government can seek reimbursement up
to statutorily defined limits for money it expended in cleaning up or mitigating the release.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1976). The discharger, however, cannot be ordered to clean up the release; instead, the discharger is notified that failure to do so will subject him to liability for
government expenditures. THE SUPERFUND CONCEPTr, supra note 9, at 33.
68. A legal memorandum concerning liability under § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1976), suggested that the use of the disjunctive "or" clearly indicated that

the statute contemplated several liability. 126

CONG.

REc. H11,789 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)

(statement of G.H. Patrick Bursley). But the memorandum also noted that "the word 'or'
need not be read solely in the disjunctive sense, but clearly contemplates joint liability as
well to achieve the remedial effect of the Act." Id. (emphasis in the original).
69. Only one case discusses joint and several liability under § 311 of the Clean Water
Act. United States v. MN Big Sam, 505 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. La. 1981). In M/V Big Sam,
the court stated that third party liability under § 311(g) was several. Id. at 1033. The court,
however, intimated that liability for owners and operators under § 311(f) may be joint. Id.
at 1033-34.
70. Section 311 of the Clean Water Act actually provides little assistance in determining
liability under Superfund for two reasons. First, under the Clean Water Act only owners or
operators are liable for oil spills. Under Superfund the number of liable parties may range
from a minimum of one to a maximum of hundreds. Second, an oil spill is readily discoverable and generally is cleaned up shortly after discovery. A release of hazardous substances
may not be discovered for decades, as in the Love Canal situation, and clean up efforts may
take several years. During this delay many other parties may become involved, such as the
successive owners of the land upon which the disposal site resta. As a result, the issue of
liability under Superfund involves more parties and a much more complex fact situation.
71. See F. HARPER & F. JAMEsi LAW OF TORTs 692-97 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
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the common law, a joint tort required that liability for the entire
harm be imposed upon all tortfeasors who acted in concert. 7 The
early common law also required concert of action before defendants could be joined in a single action. 7" Therefore, concert of action had to be established before joint and several liability would
be assigned or before joinder of parties would be allowed. Consequently, the substantial theory of entire liability under joint torts
and the procedural concept of joinder became associated.1 '
The enactment of the Field Code in New York in 1848 and of
later similar codes in a majority of states expanded the scope of
joinder in both law and equity." As a result of this procedural re-

form, defendants who were necessary to the complete determination or settlement of issues involved in the controversy or who
claimed an interest adverse to the plaintiff in the controversy
could be joined.7 Even though concert of action was no longer required for joinder under the Field Code, the majority of courts reHARPER & JAMES]; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OP TORTS 291-99 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as LAW OF TORTS]; Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L.

REv. 399, 403-06 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
72. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 71, at 291; Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25
CALip. L. REV. 413, 414 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]. Prosser noted that a joint tort
required a joint enterprise. A joint enterprise exists where two or more persons provide
mutual aid in effectuating a common purpose so that all commit an unlawful act thereby
making each liable for the entire damage. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 71, at 291; Prosser,
supra this note, at 414. Other commentators have stated that a joint tort at early common
law necessitated the existence of concert of action or breach of a joint duty. HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 71, at 692.
The theory of concert of action as expressed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 876
(1977) provides:

For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.
73. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 71, at 293; Prosser, supra note 72, at 414. The common
law rule of joinder was strictly applied, but some common law courts allowed joinder where
there was dual responsibility for a single act, e.g., the mutual liability of master and servant
for the acts of the servant. Jackson, supra note 71, at 403. In addition, American courts
devised a different rule for joinder in equity cases. See Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 F. 55 (8th
Cir. 1898); Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 16 F. 25 (8th Cir. 1883).
74. Jackson, supra note 71, at 404.
75. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 71, at 294; Prosser, supra note 72, at 415.
76. Id.
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fused to allow joinder unless there was concert of action." Thus,
the courts only allowed joinder where each party was jointly and
severally liable.78
Later, courts gradually implemented the clear directive of the
codes by allowing joinder in cases where the acts of independent
multiple defendants combined to cause a single, indivisible injury
which consequently rendered apportionment of damages impossible. 7 9 The courts referred to these independent, concurrent" actions as joint torts even though joint and several liability was not
imposed.8 ' Although the courts liberalized their approach to joinder, the majority still required the existence of concert of action or
a breach of a joint duty for the imposition of joint and several liability. 82 These courts retained the requirement of concert of action
partly due to confusion surrounding the relationship of the concept
of joint tort to joinder before the enactment of the Field Code. 83
The primary reason for retention of the concert of action requirement, however, is the failure to understand the rationale underlying joint and several liability."
Wigmore contended that a historical reason existed for imposing
joint and several liability in cases involving single individual injury
regardless of proof that defendants acted in concert. 85 Wigmore
77. Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 144 Pa. 509, 22 A. 970 (1891); Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23
S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930); Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595,
102 S.E. 265 (1920). The courts failed to implement the liberal joinder provisions in the
codes chiefly because of the retention of the common law theory that the same "cause of
action" must affect all of the joined defendants. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 71, at 295; Prosser, supra note 72, at 416.
78. LAW OF TORTS, supra note 71, at 295; Prosser, supra note 72, at 416.
79. See Flaherty v. Northern Pac. R.R., 39 Minn. 328, 40 N.W. 160 (1888); Schweppe v.
Udl, 97 Neb. 328, 140 N.W. 789 (1914); Peters v. Johnson, 124 Or. 237, 264 P. 469 (1928);
Rowe v. Richards, 32 S.D. 66, 142 N.W. 664 (1913).
80. Concurrent actions need not be simultaneous. Hill v. Peres, 76 Cal. App. 74, 28 P.2d
946 (1934); Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1960). In applying joint
and several liability in an automobile collision case, the Maddux court stated: "The reason
for the rule as to joint liability for damages was the indivisibility of the injuries, not the
timing of the various blows. . . . The conclusion seems inescapable unless we take the position that 'concurrent' actually means 'simultaneous,' a position for which there is no wellreasoned authority." Id. at 434, 108 N.W.2d at 38.
81. Prosser, supra note 72, at 420.
82. Annot., 35 A.L.R. 412 (1925); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 412 (1925); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 947
(1920). See Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 255, 248 S.W.2d
731, 733 (1952).
83. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
85. Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasorsand Severance of Damages;Making the Innocent Party
Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L.F. 458 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
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maintained that the historical purpose of the common law rule of
joint and several liability for joint torts was to relieve the plaintiff
of the impossible burden of proving the specific shares of harm
caused by each defendant." Wigmore contended that each defendant should be liable for the entire harm unless he established a
method for apportioning the damages among the wrongdoers."
Thus, the burden of proving the specific percentage of harm
caused by each defendant would be shifted from the plaintiff to
the defendant.
Wigmore indicated that the requirement of concert of action for
the application of joint and several liability only served to prevent
deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages from wrongdoers.ss
Because the courts ignored the historical reason justifying the application of joint and several liability to multiple defendants who
acted concurrently to produce a single injury and opted to interpret the term "joint" to require concert of action, many wrongdoers had been allowed to go "scot free." 8' 9 Wigmore therefore concluded that the proper rule should be: "Whenever two or more
persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not, cause a single
general harm, not obviously assignable in part to the respective
wrongdoers, the injured party may recover from each for the
whole." 0
Trend Toward Applying Joint and Several Liability in Cases
Involving Indivisible Harms
Although many courts still require concert of action or a breach
of a joint duty before imposing joint and several liability, independent tortfeasors who concurrently cause an indivisible injury are
increasingly found to be jointly and severally liable.' In expanding
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 458. To illustrate this injustice, Wigmore discussed a few water pollution cases
including: Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913); Standard
Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429 (1913); and Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke
Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920). Id. at 459. For instance, the court in Farley denied
recovery to a farmer whose land was contaminated by a river polluted by six separate mining companies acting independently merely because the farmer could not possibly prove
what fraction of the pollution came from each defendant. 102 S.E. at 268-69.
90. Wigmore, supra note 85, at 459.
91. Joint liability was first imposed in automobile collision cases where a third person
was injured or his property damaged due to the negligence of the drivers of two or more
automobiles. See, e.g., Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1425 (1929); Annot., 15 A.L.R. 465 (1922). The
trend of applying joint and several liability in pollution cases gained momentum with the
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the scope of joint and several liability, most courts refer to Wigmore's classical argument. 92 The common law is thus evolving toward a more liberal application of joint and several liability.
In the leading case of Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.,' s the Supreme Court of Texas held that where the tortious
acts of multiple wrongdoers combine to produce an injury which
cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty among the individual wrongdoers, each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for
the entire harm. 4 In Landers, two pipes, one carrying salt water
and the other a mix of salt water and oil, broke at about the same
time and flowed over the plaintiff's land and into his lake. The
spill damaged the lake. The pipes, however, were owned by two
separate companies. After determining that requiring the plaintiff
to bear the burden of dividing the damages according to each defendant's contribution to the injury was unjust, the court found
that the defendants could be jointly and severally liable.' 5
The Landers court explicitly reiterated Wigmore's conclusion
that the historical purpose behind the rule of joint and several liability was to relieve the plaintiff of the intolerable burden of proving the percentage of harm caused by each defendant regardless of
whether or not concert of action was present." The court rejected

decision by the Supreme Court of Texas in Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.,
151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952), even though the courts in Oklahoma and Kansas had
previously done so. See Mosby v. Manhatten Oil Co., 52 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 677 (1931); McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 P. 899 (1913);
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Laskey, 173 Okla. 48, 46 P.2d 484 (1935); Kanola Corp. v. Palmer,
167 Okla. 430, 30 P.2d 189 (1934); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931).
See infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn. 1976); Landers
v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 255, 248 S.W.2d 731, 733 (1952).
93. 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
94. 151 Tex. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
95. 151 Tex. at 258, 248 S.W.2d at 735. In Landers, the Texas Supreme Court expressly
overruled Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930). 151 Tex. at
256, 248 S.W.2d at 733. In Robicheaux, various oil companies had drained salt water into
the bayou, and as a result, plaintiff's rice crops were damaged when this polluted water was
used for irrigation. The Texas Commission of Appeals held that the oil companies could not
be held jointly and severally liable because there was no concerted action or unity of design
between them. 23 S.W.2d at 715. The Landers court acknowledged that the holding in
Robicheaux still represented the majority view. 151 Tex. at 255, 248 S.W.2d at 733.
96. 151 Tex. at 255, 248 S.W.2d at 733. The court drew the distinction between an injury
that is theoretically divisible but practically indivisible. Id. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734. In
nearly all cases, an injury may be theoretically apportioned although realistic apportionment is impossible. To prevent defendants from escaping joint liability by presenting purely
theoretical apportionment of damages, the court held several liability only applies where the
injury can be "apportioned with reasonable certainty." Id.
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the philosophy behind the majority position which provided that
"it is better that the injured party lose all of his damages than that
any of several wrongdoers should pay more of the damages than he
9
individually and separately caused. 7
Finally, the Landers court noted that Texas courts had long
since approved applying joint and several liability in collision cases
where concert of action was absent.9 s Unlike the facts in Landers,
collision cases involved simultaneous negligence. The Landers
court, however, maintained that the plaintiff's burden of dividing
the damages according to each defendant's contribution to the injury was just as onerous in cases where negligence was not simultaneous.9 9 Therefore, the court concluded that no justifiable reason
existed for allowing joint and several liability in the one type of
case and not in the other. 10 0
Nearly twenty years later, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, National Steel Corp.1 0 1 held
that under Michigan law, multiple defendants charged with public
nuisance for independent actions of polluting the air, could be held
10 2
jointly and severally liable for the individual indivisible injuries.
In Michie, thirty-seven Canadian citizens filed suit against three
corporations that operated seven plants in the United States immediately across the border from Canada. Claiming personal and
property damages from the pollution carried on air currents to
their homes, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants should be
held jointly and severally liable despite the absence of concerted
action. Applying the holding in Landers and the Michigan auto
collision cases to this pollution case, 10 8 the Sixth Circuit held that
joint and several liability could be assigned to the three corpora-

97. 151 Tex. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
98. 151 Tex. at 257-58, 248 S.W.2d at 735. Courts have increasingly applied joint and
several liabiltiy in cases involving successive collisions of automobiles. See Ruud v. Grimm,
252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321 (1961); Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33
81961); Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951). See also Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d
16 (1965).
99. 151 Tex. at 258, 248 S.W.2d at 734.

100.

Id. The court reversed and remanded the case on the grounds that allegations that

the two separate companies negligently permitted their respective pipelines to break on or
about the same date were sufficient to assert a case of joint and several liability against the
defendants. For further discussion of the Landers case, see Note, Recent Developments in
Joint and Several Liability, 14 BAYLOR L. REv. 421 (1962); Note, Liability of Independent
Tort-Feasors, 5 BAYLOR L. REv. 281 (1953).
101. 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir, 1974).
102. Id. at 218.
103. Id. at 216.
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tions. 10 The court noted that once the plaintiffs established a duty
and a breach of that duty by each of the multiple defendants, the
plaintiffs need only present enough evidence to create a presumption of indivisible injury. 105 Plaintiff's successful establishment of
this presumption was sufficient to shift the burden of proving the
degree of responsibility of the parties to the wrongdoers.es
Adopting the rule of the Landers and Michie cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Rowe10 7 held that
where several plants emitted pollutants into the air and water, so
as to create an indivisible injury, each plant could be held jointly
and severally liable without concert of action.10 8 In Velsicol, the
plaintiffs originally sued Velsicol Chemical Corporation alone. 09
Velsicol, however, filed a third party complaint against five other
plants in the locality. In overruling a seventy-five year old precedent that was markedly similar to the facts in Velsicol," 0 the court
noted the increasing tendency in judicial decisions and among
commentators to sanction holding defendants jointly and severally
liable for tortious injuries that are "joint" in their legal or practical
effect, although not joint in their commission."'
In the past thirty years, courts have increasingly applied joint
and several liability where tortfeasors have acted independently to
cause an indivisible injury. This trend is largely due to the court's
recognition of the injustice of placing the burden of apportionment

104. Id. at 218-19.
105. Id. at 216-18.
106. Id. The holding in Michie has changed prior notions of duties and risks in nuisance
cases. Comment, Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, National Steel Corp.-The Emergence of Joint and Several Liability in a Common Law Environmental Action, 74 UTAH L.
REv. 603, 610 (1974). Before the Michie decision, plaintiffs in nuisance actions had to set
forth the particular duty of each defendant and prove that each defendant caused definite
and traceable damages before the suit could go to the jury. Id.
107. 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976).
108. Id. at 343. The court stressed that the rule announced in the Landers and Michie
cases is "more consonant with modern legal thought and pragmatic concepts of justice ..
" Id.
109. In addition to charges of air and water pollution, plaintiffs further alleged that Velsicol dumped chemicals and other pollutants upon their properties. Id. at 338.
110. Id. at 343. The court overruled Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430, 78
S.W. 93 (1903). The Swain court refused to hold joint tortfeasors jointly and severally liable
where they acted independently to cause an indivisible injury primarily because contribution was not allowed among tortfeasors at that time, and thus, a tortfeasor whose actions
caused only a minute portion of the injury would be held entirely liable. 543 S.W.2d at 341.
The Velsicol court stated that this inequitable result was now precluded by the enactment
in 1968 of the Tennessee Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Id. at 340.
111. 543 S.W.2d at 342.
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of damages upon plaintiffs who have incurred indivisible injuries.11 2 In addition, the courts recognize the increasing acceptance
of allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors. "
Developments in the Restatement
The changes made by the American Law Institute in the Restatement (Second) of Torts also support the trend toward applying joint and several liability to independent wrongdoers who cause
an indivisible injury. The first significant change was the addition
of section 433A and section 433B. Section 433A provides that damages arising out of two or more causes of injury cannot be apportioned unless the harms are distinct or, a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause exists. " " Section 433A
recognizes that certain types of harms are inherently incapable of
any "logical, reasonable, or practical division."11 In such instances,
joint and several liability is imposed.116 Section 433B(2) shifts the
burden of proof of apportioning damages to the defendants when
the tortious conduct of two or more wrongdoers has combined to
cause a harm incapable of apportionment.117 Such harms are not

within the scope of section 433B. However, comment e to section
433B implies that tortfeasors who cause a harm incapable of apportionment are still jointly and severally liable.118
The most significant change appearing in the Second RestateSee supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
See supra note 110 and infra note 144.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
115. Id. at comment i.
116. Id. In illustration 15, two companies that negligently discharged oil into a stream
were jointly and severally liable to owners of the cattle which died after drinking the water
of the stream. Id.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965) at comment c. Pollution of a
stream by a number of factories is classified as a typical case. Id. The underlying assumption that the harm caused by pollution may be divided is dubious at best.
118. Id. This implication is derived from the following statement: "Thus if a hundred
factories each contribute a small, but still uncertain, amount of pollution to a stream to
hold each of them liable for the entire damage because he cannot show the amount of his
contribution may perhaps be unjust." Id. (emphasis supplied). Thus while recognizing there
might be a certain injustice in holding one defendant out of a class of a hundred jointly
liable, this statement indicates that under § 433B(2) a defendant who contributes an uncertain amount to the injury thereby rendering apportionment of damages as to him impossible
is nonetheless jointly liable for the entire harm. Furthermore, if §§ 433A and 433B(2) are to
read as complimentary and consistent, there must be joint liability for indivisible injuries
under § 433B(2) because comment i to § 433A provides for joint liability for single injuries
"incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433A comment i (1965). See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
112.
113.
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ment was the revision of section 881. In the first Restatement of
Torts, section 881 provided for several liability where multiple defendants independently created or maintained a nuisance by interfering with, inter alia, the air or flowing water on another's land.11
Section 881 clearly expressed the majority view that in pollution
cases several liability was assignable to multiple tortfeasors who
did not act in concert but caused an indivisible injury.2 0
Nearly forty years later under the direction of the American Law
Institute, section 881 was completely revised.12 Section 881 is no
longer limited to nuisance actions. More importantly, the revised
section 881 only imposes several liability upon multiple defendants
acting independently in cases where there exist distinct harms or a
single harm capable of division according to the contribution of
each defendant.12 Since section 881 is thereby solely concerned

with harms that are capable of apportionment, comment a of section 881 directs attention to section 875 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
the rule regarding harms that are incapable of
12 3
apportionment.

Section 875 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts assigns joint
liability to each tortfeasor where the tortious conduct of multiple
parties is the legal cause of a single and indivisible harm.1 24 Section

119.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 881 (1939). Section 881 specifically provides:
Where two or more persons, each'acting independently, create or maintain a situation which is a tortious invasion of a landowner's interest in the use and enjoyment of land by interfering with his quiet, light, air or flowing water, each is liable
only for such proportion of the harm caused to the land or of the loss of enjoyment of it by the owner as his contribution to the harm bears to the total harm.
120. In Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir.
1974), the court referred to § 881 of the first Restatement of the Law of Torts as the "old"
rule and instead relied on the "newer" rule of § 433B of the Second Restatement to hold
polluters jointly and severally liable. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 881 (1977). The revised § 881 provides:
If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct harms or a
single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the
contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the total
harm that he has himself caused.
122. Comment a to § 881 explains that § 881 is an application of § 433A, which draws a
distinction between harms for which damages can be apportioned and harms for which ap-

portionment is not possible.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 881 comment a (1977). See

supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.

123.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 881, comment a (1977). Comment a contains a

misprint for it directs attention to § 675 for harms that are incapable of apportionment.
However, § 675 only covers the existence of probable cause. Section 875 is the correct section. Professor Weschler, the director of the American Law Institute, was notified by telephone of this misprint on February 22, 1982.
124. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977). Section 875 specifically provides:
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875 of the second Restatement differs significantly from the original provision.1 28 First, section 875 of the first Restatement did not
expressly recognize single, indivisible harms. 12 1 Second and more
important, section 875 of the first Restatement exempted from
coverage those nuisances that came within the scope of section 881
of the first Restatement.2 7 Therefore, under the first Restatement,
multiple defendants who acted independently in causing nuisances
by polluting streams would be held severally liable regardless of
whether the resulting harm was capable or incapable of division.
This is so because such a nuisance was governed solely by section
881, which did not recognize that certain harms were incapable of
apportionment. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, those
defendants would be held jointly and severally liable if they acted
in concert12 8 or if they acted concurrently to cause a harm that
29
could not be apportioned.
Sections 433A, 433B, 875, 879 and 881, when read as a whole,
establish that the American Law Institute has adopted the position
of a growing number of courts; that is, multiple defendants who act
independently to cause a single, indivisible injury are jointly and
severally liable. The addition of section 433A indicates the Institute's recognition of harms that are incapable of apportionment
and of the necessity of applying joint and several liability in such
instances. The shifting of the burden of proof as to apportionment
of damages to the defendant under section 433B corrects the past
inequity of placing this burden upon a plaintiff who frequently is
unable to bear the burden. Finally, the revision of sections 881, 875

Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single
and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party
for the entire harm.
125. Section 875 of the first Restatement provides:
Except as stated in § 881, each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a
legal cause of harm to another is liable to the other for the entire harm.
126. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). Section 876 is a specific application
of the rule in § 875 to situations involving concert of action. Id. at § 875 comment a.
129. Id. at § 879. Section 879 is a specific application of the rule in § 875 to situations
involving the concurrent or consecutive causation of a single and indivisible harm. Id. at §
875 comment a. Section 879 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
If the tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal cause of harm that
cannot be apportioned, each is subject to liability for the entire harm, irrespective
of whether their conduct is concurring or consecutive.
In comment a to § 879, it is noted that it is immaterial that one of the tortfeasors is
primarily at fault for causing the harm. Id. at § 879, comment a.
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and 879 eliminates the requirement of imposing several liability

upon multiple defendants whose independent pollution of the environment creates an indivisible harm. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts, as an indicator of evolving principles of common law, favors joint and several liability for independent polluters who cause

an indivisible harm.
Application of Joint and Several Liability to Situations
Involving Hazardous Substances
The primary purpose of Superfund is to provide emergency
funds for the immediate clean up of hazardous substances at facili-

ties that present an imminent danger to the public health and welfare and the environment. Liability for the release of hazardous
substances, however, is placed upon owners and operators of disposal facilities, generators of hazardous substances, and transporters
of hazardous substances. 1 0 Because the fund is limited to $1.6 billion and the costs of the most limited restoration of inactive hazardous waste facilities range from $3 to $6 million,"' the assignment of joint and several liability is essential to the purpose of

Superfund. Joint and several liability will significantly ease the
government's burden of establishing liability. It also will allow the
government to recover full damages without the impossible task of
locating all the responsible parties. Furthermore, it will provide
even though many responsifull reimbursement to the government
32

ble parties may be insolvent.4
The issue of joint and several liability for the costs of cleanup
and damages associated with a release of hazardous substances

arises in at least three contexts.83 The first context involves the
130. 42 U.S.C. § 9706(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. According to the EPA, the $1.6 billion
fund will be utilized in cleaning up approximately 400 disposal sites nationwide. 115 Worst
U.S. Dumpsites Targeted for Cleanup Under Superfund Program, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
808 (Oct. 30, 1980). During the next five years, the EPA expects to use the fund at 170 sites
and to institute enforcement actions to force cleanup of the remaining 230 sites. Id. The
EPA believes that an average of $4 million will be spent on each disposal site. Id. The
assistant administrator for solid waste and emergency response of the EPA stated that $65
million had beed allocated by the EPA for remedial actions at 59 sites and that the EPA has
authorized 77 emergency response actions, which total $25 million. Government's Update
on Carrying out Superfund Meets with Criticism at Hearing, [Current Developments]
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 14 at 469 (August 6, 1982).
132. Hazardous waste disposal companies, for instance, are increasingly filing for bankruptcy to avoid the potentially astronomical costs of cleaning up their disposal facilities.
Papa & Cohen, The Bankruptcy Tactic, 12 WASTE AGE 76 (1981).
133. Rodburg, Generator Liability for Off-Site Disposal, HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION:
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liability between and within the classes of owner, operator, generator, and transporter. The second context covers successive liability.
Because the discovery of releases of hazardous substances may occur long after the original disposal, successive parties may have
carried out the role of generator, tranporter, owner and operator.
Thus, it must be determined if successor corporations who assumed these roles can be held jointly and severally liable. The
third context arises where disposal facilities in the same vicinity
may have released hazardous substances and it cannot be determined which facilities released the substances. Therefore, the court
must decide whether to impose joint and several liability upon
each facility.
Joint and Several Liability Among Generators, Transporters,
Owners and Operators
Although the actions of the generator, transporter and owner or
operator of the waste site are different as to nature and function, 3 4
the combination of their actions creates an indivisible injury under
Superfund, such as the pollution of land, surface water and/or
groundwater. " If a hazardous substance is released into the environment from an inactive site, each party under section 107 of
Superfund is strictly liable for the costs of the cleanup and any
damages resulting in injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources. 3 6 In bringing suit against the generator, transporter and

LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE SERIES

87, 163-65 (PLI 1981) [hereinafter cited as

Rodburg].
134. Id. at 165.
135. Id. In a letter to Congressman Florio concerning joint and several liability under
Superfund, Alan A. Parker, the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs,
wrote: "An indivisible harm is frequently the situation at hazardous waste sites where many
parties have contributed to the contamination or other endangerment and there are no reliable records indicating who disposed of the hazardous wastes (or in what quantities)." 126
CONG. REC. H11,788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
In a recent opinion, a district court has held that a city that owned a landfill upon which
hazardous substances were illegally dumped could sue the generators for recovery of the cost
of cleanup and damages under § 107(A)(4)(b) even though no Superfund monies were expended. City of Philadelphia v. Stepam Chem. Co., No. 81-0851 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 4, 1982).
The court noted that had the federal or state government undertaken the cleanup of the
landfill, both the city, as the owner and operator of the site, and the generators would be
liable for the cost of removal or other remedial action. But since the city had shouldered the
costs of the cleanup, the court justified its recovery of the costs and damages on the following basis:
• . . it is clear from the discussions which preceded the passage of [Superfund]
that the statute is designed to achieve one key objective-to facilitate the prompt
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owner or operator of the disposal facility, the government bears
the burden of establishing a release or threatened release.
Assuming joint and several liability is adopted by courts applying Superfund, each defendant will be liable for the entire amount

of costs and damages, unless the defendant presents evidence as to
how damages may be practically apportioned. Possible methods for
apportionment include quantity of the wastes,13 7 degree of toxicity

of the wastes,"3

or risk of harm associated with the wastes.1 39

The argument most frequently raised against the assignment of
joint and several liability under Superfund is the "one barrel" scenario.14 0 Under this argument, a generator deposits one barrel of

hazardous substances at a disposal site that stores thousands of
barrels containing various hazardous substances. Many years later,

government officials discover that hazardous substances have
leaked from this disposal site, and contaminated nearby land, surface water, and groundwater. The only solvent party that can be
located is the generator of the one barrel of hazardous waste. The
generator is then held jointly liable for the entire cost of cleaning

and damages, which may amount to millions of dollars.
Even assuming joint and several liability is imposed, the generator will not necessarily be held entirely liable. First, the generator
has the opportunity to apportion damages by submitting proof of
quantity, toxicity, or risk of the hazardous substances contained in
the barrel.14 1 If the generator succeeds in apportioning his contri-

clean up of hazardous dumpsites by providing a means of financing both governmental and private responses and by placing the ultimate financial burden upon
those responsible for the danger. The liability provision is an integral part of the
statute's method of achieving this goal for it gives a private party the right to
recover its response costs from responsible third parties which it may choose to
pursue rather than claiming against the fund.
Id.
137. Rodburg, supra note 133, at 166. In one case, a chemical analysis of soil contaminated by the leakage from a nearby disposal site revealed the presence of chlorinated hydrocarbons. Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 604 (La. App. 1978). After
the court examined the proof of wastes dumped by ten chemical and oil companies, it found
only one of the companies had dumped chlorinated hydrocarbons. That company along with
the operator of the disposal site were held jointly liable. Id. at 608.
138. Rodburg, supra note 133, at 166.
139. Id. at 166-67.
140. E.g., Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings on S. 1341 and S. 1480
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protectionof the Senate
Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 723 (1979) (statement of
Frank B. Friedman on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter cited
as Hazardous Waste Hearings].
141. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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bution to the total damage, he will be liable only for the damage
caused by the one barrel. Second, only those who substantially
contribute to the harm are held liable in law and equity even when
the imposition of joint and several liability is possible.' 42 The generator of one barrel of hazardous substances with a relatively low
toxicity, therefore, would not be held liable for the cost of cleanup
where hundreds of barrels containing highly toxic chemicals also
released their contents."4 "
Increasing acceptance of rules allowing contribution supports the
assignment of joint and several liability under Superfund. Rarely
will only one responsible party be sued under Superfund because
most jurisdictions recognize a right to contribution between
tortfeasors.'"

If only one party is named in a suit under

Superfund, however, it will not have to bear the entire loss. The
state's recognition of the right to contribution greatly diminishes
the possibility of the inequitable result of 14one
defendant being
5
made to carry the entire burden of liability.
142.

This is a test of significance, rather than of largeness or smallness, or quantum.

McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P.2d 869 (1969). See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 431, 433 (1965). In equity, the courts refer to the maxim that "the law does not concern
itself about trifles." See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
143. However, the danger presented by hazardous substances differs significantly from
other types of pollutants because a relatively small release of a highly toxic chemical, such
as dioxin, may cause substantial damage. Consequently, the generator of highly toxic chemicals contained in a barrel that leaked at a disposal site storing hundreds of other wastes may
be liable for most of the damages. Thus, joint liability is justified where the leaking of the
one barrel substantially contributed to the overall harm.
144. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87 n.17 (1981).
Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia provide for contribution to some extent
among joint tortfeasors. Id. See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973). At common law, however, contribution was not allowed among joint tortfeasors because of an incorrect application of Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1137 (K.B. 1799). For a
historical discussion, see Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-feasors, 81 U.
PA. L. REV. 130 (1932); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958).
145. Note, Conscripting Industry Support, supra note 37, at 547. However, the Supreme
Court has recently held that absent statutory authority or "uniquely federal interests" federal courts cannot formulate a common law of contribution. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). It has been suggested that statutory authority can be
found in § 107(a)(4)(B) of Superfund. 2 CHEMICAL & RADIATION WASTE LITIGATION REP. 540
(1981). But § 107(a)(4)(B) only provides that owners, operators, generators and transporters
will be liable for all other necessary costs borne by persons other than the United States
government or a state. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(A)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 107(a)(4)(B)
neither expressly nor impliedly provides for contribution. Furthermore, contribution cannot
be justified upon "uniquely federal interests" since contribution between the violators of
Superfund does not "involve the duties of the Federal Government, the distribution of powers in our federal system, or matters necessarily subject to federal control even in the absence of statutory authority." Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. at 642.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

Joint and Several Liability Among Successive Parties
In the second context where successive parties may have carried
out the role of generator, transporter, owner or operator, the issue
of liability becomes more complicated. If the generator, transporter, owner or operator is a corporation, the question of successor corporate liability arises. The majority of jurisdictions adhere
to the general rule that a corporation which buys the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of the selling
corporation."' There are four traditional exceptions to the general
rule of nonassumption: (1) the purchase agreement which is interpreted to expressly or impliedly include those liabilities;' (2) the
sale which constitutes a fraudulent attempt to escape liability; '
(3) the purchase which amounts to a de facto merger; 149 and (4)
the successor corporation which is basically a continuation of the
predecessor corporation. 50 In recent years, a few courts have created a new exception in which a successor corporation assumes
strict liability for defective products that had been manufactured
by its predecessor corporation."5 "

In addition, indemnification, hold harmless or similar agreements or conveyances that
transfer liability from a responsible party to another are invalid under Superfund. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(3)(1) (Supp. IV 1980): Insurance agreements, however, are expressly exempted from
this prohibition. Id. Thus Superfund arguably extends liability for coverage of a release
back to insurance companies which had insured a disposal site in the past, but not at the
time of the release. Cross, New Hazards for Hazardous Waste Managers, 13 PoLUTION
ENGINEERING 28, 29 (1981). An insurance company that cancels its coverage of a disposal site
on grounds of poor management or other practices which increase the possibility of environ-

mental damage may not be able to avoid liability later. Id.
146. 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev.
perm. ed. 1981).
147. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); R.J. Enstrom Corp. v.
Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1977); Goldstein v. Gardner, 444 F. Supp. 581
(N.D. Ill. 1978).
148. Id. See also Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 884-87 (1973).

149. R.J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor. 555 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1977); Knapp v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Goldstein v. Gardner, 444 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Ladjeuardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc.,

431 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.
Mich. 1974).
150. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); Leannais v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Cyr. v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974);
Groover v. West Coast Shipping Co., 479 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
151. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad Corp.,
19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244
N.W.2d 873 (1976); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261 408 A.2d 818 (App.
Div. (1979), afl'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). See also Heitland, Survival of Products
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Although there is not much case law on successor corporate lia-

bility for pollution involving hazardous substances, the New Jersey
courts have considered the problem. In State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 5 the court
held a predecessor corporation and a successor corporation jointly
and severally liable for the release of mercury from a processing
plant onto the surrounding land and into a nearby creek. 53 Although the predecessor corporation had operated the plant for over
twice as long as the successor, the court refused to apportion the
harm.'" However, the court held the parent corporations of the
successor corporation severally liable apparently on the grounds
that their responsibility for the operation of successor corporation
could be divided by the number of years each exercised control
55
over the successor.
One year later in Department of Transportation v. PSC Resources, Inc.,i1" another New Jersey court held that a successor
corporation could be held strictly liable for the environmental torts
of a predecessor corporation, which had subsequently been dissolved.157 In PSC Resources, the successor corporation continued
its predecessor's practice of pumping polluted waste water into a
lake owned by the Department of Transportation. The court recognized that the nature of the policy considerations of a product lia-

Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAw 489 (1979); Note, Products Liability:
Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for Product-RelatedInjuries, 12 U. MICH.
J.L. REP. 338 (1979); Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 826 (1975).
152. Nos. C-2996-75, C-1954-77, C-1110-78 (N.J. Sup. Ct. August 27, 1979) (available in
179 Litigation and Administrative Practice Series 219 (PLI 1981) [hereinafter cited as Litigation Series].
153. Litigation Series, supra note 152, at 242.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 241-42. The Ventron court, however, did stress that the liability of the predecessor and successor corporations that owned the plant was direct and primary; whereas, the
liability of parent corporations was partly direct and partly derivative. Id. at 241. The court
took a novel approach to a state's liability for releases of hazardous wastes. The court held
that the New Jersey Spill Fund was the appropriate source of funds to remedy a hazardous
situation "[w]here any element of expense [remedy] is not chargeable or collectible from any
defendant or where the expenses are the result of an inappropriate State action or inaction."
Id. at 242-43. The court found that the state should have shut down the plant in 1968, when
a study revealed high levels of mercury pollution in the plant's effluent. Even when the state
worked with some of the defendants during the early seventies, the effluent still contained
an unsatisfactory level of mercury. Although the court recognized that the "state's actions
were less than forceful, less than prompt, and perhaps somewhat misleading, the defendants
cannot bring a suit for damages against the state." Id. at 263.
156. 15 E.R.C. 1053 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1980).
157. Id. at 1063.
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bility action were adequately analogous to a pollution action, so as
to warrant extension of the defective products exception to the
general rule of successor corporate liability. The court held that a
successor corporation was liable for the damages caused by any
discharges of hazardous substances by its predecessor. Such liability is limited to cases where the successor corporation acquires all
or substantially all the assets of the predecessor corporation for
cash and continues essentially the same operation as the predecessor corporation. 15

The New Jersey courts have recognized the necessity of holding
predecessor and successor corporations jointly and severally liable

for the costs of cleaning up hazardous substances. The justification
for imposing joint and several liability is a combination of the rationale underlying products liability actions and the necessity of
preserving the quality of the environment.' 9

158. Id. at 1061 (quoting Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 278, 408
A.2d 818, 827 (App. Div. 1979), a/I'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981)). As to the policy
considerations, the court found that the refinery was in a better position than the public to
protect itself and bear the costs of discharging pollutants. Id. at 1061. In addition, it is the
responsibility of the refiner to improve the waste disposal process. Id. Finally, the court
concluded that the new law will not allow polluters to escape liability since their misuse of
resources has led to the "diminishing quantity and quality of our environment ..
" Id.
(quoting City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 177-78 (Law Div. 1976)).
159. The allocation of liability between successive owners of hazardous waste disposal
facilities also poses a difficult problem. Under § 107(a)(1) of Superfund, it is clear that an
owner and operator of a disposal facility is liable for the costs of cleanup and damages. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 107(a)(2) imposes liability upon parties owning
the land at the time of disposal, regardless of ownership interest at the time of the litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Inactive disposal facilities, however, are frequently sold to third parties who have no connection with the prior disposal operation. See
Hazardous Waste Hearings,supra note 140, at 325-26. Mere ownership of a disposal facility
appears to be an insufficient basis for liability under Superfund since § 107(a)(1) applies to
current landowners who own and operate a disposal facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp.
IV 1980). Cf. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 876
A.2d 1339 (1977); Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443,
387 A.2d 142 (1978), aff'd sub nom. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 489
Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980) (courts traditionally have refused to hold innocent purchasers of land liable for nuisances caused by earlier owners). Therefore, under this strict interpretation of § 107(a)(1), someone who owns but does not operate a facility will not be liable
even though he had knowledge of improperly disposed hazardous substances, and he failed
to implement corrective measures.
Such a landowner, however, may be liable under common law. See Clark v. Boysen, 39
F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1930); Meadowlark Farms, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 17 InI.
App. 3d 851, 308 N.E.2d 829 (1974); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp.
Nos. C-2996-75, C-1954-77, C-1110-78 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 1979), Rodburg supra note
133. Under § 839 of the Restatement of Torts, a possessor of land is liable for an "abateable
artificial condition." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 839 (1977). See also Mott, Liability
for Cleanup of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 14 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 379,
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In the third context, one or more disposal facilities located in
close proximity to one another may have released hazardous substances. It also makes sense to apply joint and several liability in
this case. Before joint and several liability may be imposed, however, the government must prove that each named party actually
contributed to the release or threatened release. The mere possibility that disposed wastes may have been released is not a sufficient
basis for assigning joint and several liability. An insurmountable
barrier to the application of joint and several liability may yet
arise where all of the disposal facilities in a vicinity contain the
same hazardous substances released, but it is impossible to determine whether each facility actually contributed to the release. 6"
413-17 (1982). Mott, Liability for Clean-up of Inactive Hazardous Disposal Sites, HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION: LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE SERIES 11 (PLI 1981); Cohen, Landowner Liability Under Common Law, RCRA, the Clean Water Act, the Refuse
Act and CERCLA, 2 CHEMICAL & RADIATION WASTE LITIGATION REP. 402 (1981).
160. "[T]he complex task of determining what is on a site, in what quantities and linking that, through pathways to the environment, to the environmental contamination often
involves very complicated geohydrological studies . . . the elements of proof are quite difficult there." Hearings on Hazardous Waste Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 127
(1980). Where several generators deposit their wastes at a common dumpsite, it may prove
impossible to link contamination of the groundwater, for instance, with any particular company or to determine any company's proportionate contribution. Zener, Stakes High in Civil
Suits for Waste Damages, 1 CHEMICAL & RADIATION WASTE LITIGATION REP. 432, 434 (1981).
Although disposal facilities in the same vicinity that contain the same hazardous substances released but there is no evidence that these facilities actually released the substances cannot be held jointly and severally liable, they may be held liable under the theory
of market share liabilty. The problem of identifying which facilities actually released the
hazardous substances is analogous to the difficulty of establishing causation in products liability cases involving fungible products. The elements of a cause of action in products liability include proof of defect, identification of the particular party responsible for the defect,
and proof that the defect in the product caused the injury. 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2d §§ 1:7, 1:28, 1:41 (1980). A plaintiff's failure to identify
the defendant as the manufacturer or seller of the defective product has traditionally
proven fatal to recovery. See Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 480, 364
N.E.2d 502 (1977); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1973).
Courts developed various theories to shift the burden of identifying the manufacturer of a
defective product to the defendants. The theory of concert of action was utilized under
certain circumstances. See supra note 72. Under the theory of alternative liability, a plaintiff unable to identify which one of multiple defendants caused his injury may shift the
burden of identification to the defendants so long as each defendant committed a tortious
act and the injury incurred by the plaintiff was the result of the acts of one of the 'defendants. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 45 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433B(3) (1965). The theory of enterprise liability provided that the loss be borne by
the enterprise or an industry, rather than distributed to each manufacturer in the industry
on a basis of individual fault. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
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(E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14
IND. L. REV. 695, 701 (1981).
Recently, the courts have been confronted with cases in which defective fungible products, such as asbestos and DES, produce an indivisible injury which does not become manifest until approximately fifteen to twenty-five years later, when the identification of the
specific manufacturer is impossible through no fault of the plaintiff. Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 58, 607 P.2d 924, 925, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In Sindell, the California
Supreme Court developed a new theory entitled market share liability. 607 P.2d at 937.
Under market share liability, once a plaintiff injured by a fungible product joins the manufactures of a substantial share of the defective product, the burden of identification is
shifted to the defendants. Id. Each defendant is liable for the portion of the judgment that
corresponds to its share of the market unless the defendants show that they could not have
made the product. Id.
In Sindell, plaintiffs brought a class action against eleven drug companies for injuries
sustained from consumption of DES by plaintiffs' mothers during pregnancy. The court
found the theories of alternative liability, concert of action and enterprise liability inapplicable. The court refused to apply alternative liability because all the drug companies that
may have manufactured the DES ingested by the plaintiff's mother may not have been
joined, and the Summers rule requires joinder of all parties who did cause or could have
caused the injury. Id. at 931. See supra note 165. The court rejected concert of action on
three grounds: first, the theory was limited to cases where a few persons directly encouraged
or engaged in a joint activity involving one tortious act; second, the plaintiff's allegations
failed to establish that a tacit understanding or mutual agreement to commit a tortious act
existed between the defendants; and third, no evidence was presented that indicated that
the defendants assisted or encouraged other drug companies to conduct inadequate tests on
DES and to distribute inadequate warnings. Id. at 932-33. See supra note 166. Finally, the
court declined to apply the enterprise liability theory since it would be unfair to impose
liability upon drug companies that did not supply the DES merely because they adhered to
the standards of the industry which were later found to be negligent. Id. at 935. See supra
note 167.
Under market share liability, a manufacturer who controls a significant portion of the
market may be held liable for a large percentage because it cannot be proven that another
manufacturer actually produced the product. Id. at 937. The court explained that this result
is justified because "each manufacturer's liability would approximate its responsibility for
the injuries caused by its own products." Id. Furthermore, a defendant may be held liable
for a greater percentage of the damage than its share of the appropriate market. Id.
A critical question left unanswered is what constitutes a "substantial" share of the market. The court refused to adopt 75-80% of the market as the measure of substantial. Id. As
the dissent noted, the answer as to what amounts to substantial is "anyone's guess." Id. at
939 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Four basic policy reasons underlie the market share theory of liability. First, adoption of
the rules of causation and liability is mandated by our increasing complex, industrialized
society which through advances in science and technology creates harmful fungible goods
and through mass production and intricate marketing methods precludes the tracing of the
product to any specific producer. Id. at 936. Second, as between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the defendants should be liable for the cost of the injury. Id. Third,
defendants are better able to shoulder the costs of injury due to the manufacture of a defective product. Id. Fourth, since a manufacturer occupies the best position for discovering and
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waste facilities that release or present a substantial threat of release of hazardous substances. The provision originally assigning
joint and several liability to the owners and operators of disposal
facilities, the generators of the hazardous substances, and the
transporters of the hazardous substances was deleted from the
final version of Superfund. The committeemen responsible for
Superfund in both the Senate and the House, as well as other
sponsors, stressed that section 311 of the Clean Water Act and the
traditional and evolving principles of common law would determine the scope of liability in the absence of the express provision
of joint and several liability.
Since neither section 311 nor the case law thereunder addresses
the issue of joint and several liability, the Clean Water Act fails to
provide assistance in defining the scope of liability under
Superfund. Under the common law, the traditional and majority
position would restrict application of joint and several liability
under Superfund to those extremely rare instances where the parties acted in concert. The evolving and increasingly accepted position, however, would impose joint and several liability under
guarding against defects in its product, holding it liable for defects and failure to warn of
harmful consequences will encourage product safety. Id.
The manufacture of defective fungible products is clearly analogous to the improper disposal of hazardous wastes. Hazardous substances are fungible. Since the actual release of
hazardous substances may have occurred several years ago, thereby allowing disbursement
of the wastes over significant distances, it may be impossible to identify which disposal site
in a potentially huge geographical area released the hazardous substances. Finally, as in
many products liability cases, the standard of liability for a release of hazardous substance
is strict.
The only significant difference between the manufacture of defective fungible products
and the improper storage of hazardous substances is that products liability actions are for
damages resulting from personal injury; whereas actions under .Superfund are for recovery
of cleanup costs associated with damage to the environment. This distinction loses significance when considering that releases of hazardous substances can cause irreparable damage
to the environment and that the deterrent effect of Superfund will be defeated unless potentially liable parties are joined in the action.
The same policy reasons that underlie the application of market share liability to products liability actions also support application to Superfund actions. First, hazardous substances, such as dioxin, are the result of advances in technology and because of their fungible nature cannot be traced back to the disposal facility that released them. Second, as
between the government and the disposal facilities that contributed to the harm, the facilities should bear the costs of cleanup and the damages. Third, disposal facilities as represented by owners, operators, generators, and transporters are better able to bear the costs of
cleanup and the damages, because Superfund is limited to $1.6 billion, although the costs
and monetary damages could easily exceed $2 to $3 billion. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. Finally, holding disposal facilities liable serves to deter future improper storage and may even cause responsible parties to clean up disposal facilities without threat of
prosecution.

522

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

Superfund where the contamination caused by a release of hazardous substances constituted an indivisible injury. Under this trend,
the defendants would be protected from being held liable for the
entire harm if they established that the damages can be practically
apportioned, that they did not substantially contribute to the
harm, and that a right to contribution from other responsible parties exists under state law.
Joint and several liability is also necessary if the fund is to be
preserved and the purpose of Superfund fulfilled. That purpose is
to preserve the fund for emergency action and for abandoned disposal facilities where no solvent, responsible parties can be located.
Assignment of joint and several liability also may deter future improper disposal of hazardous substances and may even encourage
responsible parties to clean up inactive disposal facilities without
resort to actual prosecution.
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